209 

py i 



EXTENSION DIVISION 
BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 

Serial No. 906, General Series No. 695 Z 

Issued monthly by the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Wisconsin 

Entered as second-class matter July 1 I, 1916, at the postomce, at Madison, Wis., under 

the Act of August 24, 1912 



Correspondence-Study 



Modern European History and 
The Great War 



A SYLLABUS 



by 
Professor Victor Coffin 



Price 10 cents 




MADISON 
Copyrighted 
March, 1918 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A. General History. 

Hazen, C. D. — Europe Sinee 1810. 
Gibbons, H. A. — The New Map of Europe. 
it it tt _ The Xew Map of Africa. 
Smith, Monroe — Bismarck and German Unity. 
Rose, J. II. — The Development of the European Nations. 
Day, C. — A History of Commerce. 
Gibbins, H. B. — Industrial History of England. 
Woodward, W. H. — The Expansion of the British Empire. 
Slater, G. — The Making of Modern England. 
Toynbee, A. — The Industrial Revolution. 

B. European Institutions. 

Tower, Chas. — Germany of Today. 

Ogg, F. A. — The Governments of Europe. 

Lowell, A. L. — The Governments and Parties of Continental Europe. 

Dewey, John — German Philosophy and .Politics. 

Guerard, A. L. — French Civilization in the 1 9th Century. 

Steed, H. W. — The Hapsburg Monarchy. 

C. War Origins. 

Seymour, C. — The Diplomatic Background of the War. 
Rose, J. H. — Origins of the War. 
Cheradame, A. — The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. 
Von Mach, E. — Germany's Point of View. 
Brailsford, II.— The War of Steel and Gold. 
Alexinsky, G. — Rnssia and the Great War. 

D. The War. 

Belloc, Hilaire — A General Sketch of the European War. 

Noyes, A. D. — Financial Chapters of the War. 

Simonds, F. II.— The Great War (2 vols.). 

Villard, O. G. — Germany Embattled — An American Interpretation. 

Naumann, F. — Central Europe. 



1 For further lists sec Cambridge Modern History. Vols. X. XI, and XII. 

o. °* »• 



THE UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN 



U NIVE R s 1 T V J'] X T E NSION DlVISl N 

( !orrespondenee-S1 ady I >epar1 menl 



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$ 



- 



Officers of Administration and Instruction 

Charles Richard Van 1Ii.se, Ph. D., LL. D., 

President of the University 

Louis E. Reber, M. S. Sc. D., 

Dean, University Extension Division 

William IT. Eighty, Ph. B., 

Secretary, Correspondence-Study Department 



Modern European History and the Great 
War 



I. Europe as the Center of World History. Exploitation of the 
Modern World by Europe. Breakdown of Europe. 

Elements of European Civilization — Ancient History is for the 
most part Mediterranean history, and through it the Mediterranean 
region appears as wholly within the European field in a degree not 
found again until our own time. There is no background, then, 
for non-European development, and the main results of the de- 
velopment of civilization in Egypt and Assyria and Palestine were 
soon absorbed by the purely European regions of the North Mediter- 
ranean, so that antiquity ends with the concentration of its elements 
of development on European soil. The Mediaeval period sees the 
spread of these elements over the whole European continent, while 
the rest of the world passes, historically speaking, more or less 
out of sight. But while antiquity had been thus developing the 
combined Mediterranean foundations of modern history and trans- 
ferring them to a limited area in Europe, the remoter parts of 
Europe had been filling up with Asiatic immigrants; — Celtic, Teu- 
tonic Slavic — and the spreading of the Mediterranean civilization 
through the Middle Ages meant the civilizing, or Europeanizing, of 

[3] 



these Asiatic immigrants (and of later arrivals from Asia, as Mag- 
yars, Bulgarians, Turks). But these elements in turn modified 
that civilization in receiving it, so we may say that the civilization 
wrought out in Europe up to the modern period was largely built 
out of elements that were not European. The best blood and brain 
of Asia and Africa had crowded into the European corner of the 
world, up to the encircling seas and oceans, and there, brought of 
necessity to a stand, had been made into instruments for the further 
development of the Mediterranean culture. 

European Expansion — It is this Europe, then, compounded of the 
select of the Eastern Hemisphere, that becomes and remains the 
center of the world, and that, in the Modern period, spreads 
through the world the European peoples and the European civiliza- 
tion. This is the main theme of Modern History, this Europeaniz- 
ing of the world, and this long process of European expansion must 
be kept in mind in beginning the examination of the historical 
origins of a European war that has become a World War, we can- 
not fully understand how it so becomes a world war without having 
in mind this expansion of European power and culture that is the 
chief moving process of modern history. 

Phases or This Expansion — We cannot here follow this expan- 
sion but it is necessary to glance at some of the notable character- 
istics of this European i ? ing of the world, and especially at some 
distinctions between different phases of it. There is an Old Regime 
and a New Begime to be distinguished in this history, as in the 
domestic development of Europe proper. There is a curious paral- 
lelism, also, in the fact that, as the Old Regime exploitation of the 
world was brought (for the most part) to an end by the great 
revolutionary movements at the end of the eighteenth century | in 
Europe and America), so the New Begime exploitation seems 
destined to end with the present great explosion of war. We will 
consider the characteristics and conditions of the Old Begime ex- 
pansion of Europe, the building up of the Spanish, Portuguese. 
Dutch, French, and English colonial empires. This period ends 
with the American and French revolutions (which begin the ending 
of the Old Begime in Europe) after a slow breaking down through 
the eighteenth century, caused mainly by the contests of the coloniz- 
ing states. The second epoch of colonizing or exploitation does 
not immediately follow the restoration in Europe, but the continuous 
development of the British Empire furnishes a transition period 
■or connecting link. The New Begime of empire-building in the 

[4] 



later nineteenth century does not include the Americas, now fully- 
occupied, but there come in now older regions, such as China and 
Turkey, that are disintegrating. The aims and processes are now 
more completely economic than in the first period, and Capitalism 
and High Finance take control. There is a transfer of European 
capital rather than of peoples; hence a process of making prole- 
tariats in large degree abroad, as at home. Governments follow in 
the wake of capitalistic enterprise, and real colonization becomes 
secondary. 

Paralysis of Europe — The paralysis of Europe by the war — a 
fatal breakdown, destined probably to end the old exploitation of 
the world, and to endanger European leadership in the world — 
Americanism as a possible successor in leadership. 



II. Autocracies, Aristocracies, and Bureaucracies of Europe. 
European Parliamentarism and Diplomacy. 

America and Europe Contrasted — Importance of realizing the 
difference between American and European public life and gov- 
ernment — the American knows nothing of "governing classes," 
though he has come to suspect that he should give more attention to 
the matter of governing interests — in practically all European coun- 
tries, however, there are not only the same industrial and financial 
governing interests as here, but, in addition, behind or above them, 
older, more strongly entrenched governing classes — of the six Great 
Powers, four (England, Germany, Austria, Russia) were before 
the war more or less dominated by the long-established Landed 
Aristocracies and Professional Bureaucracies, while in the remain- 
ing two (France and Italy) the landed aristocracies were of much 
less strength, but the bureaucracies were equally strong — three of 
the six (Germany, Austria, Russia) were strong monarchies, more 
or less autocratic, which means that the policies and administra- 
tions were in the hands of executives whom the popular will had 
not established and over whom the people had but little influence — 
the trained Professional Bureaucracy hence common to all, and 
everywhere constituted more or less a close corporation practically 
independent of the electorate and devoted first of all to executive 
interests — everywhere also the naval and military power was under 
constant control of the executive, and where that executive was per- 
manently established felt itself to be set apart from the people and 
■devoted without reserve to the executive policy — national representa- 

[5] 



tive bodies existed in all the states, but could assume control of 
the state only in England, France, and Italy, though having every- 
where a large amount of power with respect to new laws or new 
taxes — wide electoral franchise in the election of these bodies 
existed everywhere, but free political action at the polls was limited 
by capitalistic and aristocratic and administrative influences — the 
bureaucracies were drawn almost entirely from the privileged fam- 
ilies of the upper, middle industrial and professional classes and 
from the titled aristocratic families; these officials (and the officers 
of the army and navy) were trained from youth along governmental 
lines, and were thus for the most part weaned away from popular 
points of view and identified with the idea of Governing Classes. 

A special position and character were everywhere accorded to the 
diplomatic service, regarded as especially executive and confident i;il, 
and operating everywhere more or less under the Old Regime aristo- 
cratic and exclusive conditions: — ability to hold one's own in polite 
or aristocratic society was regarded as essential, and heme the serv- 
ice continued to be monopolized in most countries by members of the 
older aristocracies — these representatives of the executive power re- 
garded themselves as its confidential agents, and popular knowledge 
of its work or methods was repelled; even in the states under Parlia- 
mentary control the representatives of the people were similarly kept 
at a distance. The foreign relations of each state it was assumed 
must be secretly administered, and the records of this administra- 
tion for generations back were open only to the executive and its 
confidential agents- — the people everywhere could have, therefore, 
only general ideas of the aims and methods and principles of these 
policies, and could never know the exact relations with any other 
state or the business that was pending at any time. 

Foreign Relations Secretly Administered — Evident, therefore, 
that European Government was everywhere being conducted in the 
field of Foreign Relations in almost complete independence of the 
people, and that in the field of domestic administration the policies 
or acts of Government could be only imperfectly controlled — of 
course, in England, France, and Italy the Ministry of the day knew 
that the continuance of its power depended on its measures or their 
results commending themselves to the people; but in Germany, 
Austro-IIungary, and Russia, unless the government needed new 
revenues or new laws it could disregard the popular attitude — and 
the actual administering officials did constantly disregard it, know- 
ing that their personal interests were in no Avay dependent on popu- 

[6] 



lar approval — and these individuals it will be remembered were for 
the most part set apart by birth and education and social con- 
nections in a select class, with special relations to the monarch Leal 
head of the state and with an inborn resentment of popular claims. 

Class Antagonisms— Was especially in Central Europe that these 
anti-popular aspects of government or public life were pronounced — ■ 
no other landed or titled aristocracies or professional bureaucracies 
were so anti-popular and so reactionary as the German, Austrian. 
and Hungarian; none felt themselves identified with the ruling house 
in so intimate and personal a way — in the Upper Legislative Cham- 
bers they were vested with great power and in local rural govern- 
ment the landed families remained supreme — England had had the 
same system in the Old Eegime, but it had been rapidly breaking 
down, though the personnel of English upper politics and admin- 
istration remained still preponderantly aristocratic — and if the Eng- 
lish landed families were no longer the rulers of the country-side 
they in most cases remained the leaders. 

Eelation of all this to the justice of making distinctions between 
the governments and peoples of Europe. 

III. The New Militarism and the New Imperialism. The Politics 
of High Finance. The Dominating Fact of the Development of 
the British and German Empires. 

Militarism — Modern militarism, an offshoot, for the most part, 
of modern nationalism — the leadership in its development is as- 
sumed l»y Prussia because (lt the nationalism developed by the 
crushing of the old Prussia by Napoleon — its development in Prus- 
sia proceeds on the basis of the Prussian theory of the State, of 
Prussian autocratic centralized administration, and of Prussian ap- 
plication of Science to the Art of War — all resources of the nation 
directed to this end — plans developed for the using of these re- 
sources with complete ruthlessness and with defiance of all prev- 
iously acknowledged restraints — on principle that necessity of the 
State is the supreme law — the identifying of war and culture and 
the thesis as to the inherent Teutonic supremacy on basis of in- 
herent Teutonic superiority. 

Imperialism — Last quarter of the nineteenth century marked in 
Europe by a curious revival of feudal and autocratic points of view 
in political theory and practice — common to the large states though 
appearing in different ways — concurrent with Imperialism in for- 

(71 



eign politics or policies, with extreme Nationalism, and with Pro- 
tectionism (commercial warfare) — the main manifestation in Ger- 
many where there is a tradition and practice of autocratic pater- 
nalism, and where the Bonapartist State Socialism is developed by 
Bismarck — he defies Parliamentarism, deludes democracy, and aims 
to buy the support of the masses for autocracy by an advanced 
social policy — in the succeeding regime the support of middle class 
industrial and financial Liberalism is sought by catering to indus- 
trial interests, while High Finance becomes the right arm of bureau - 
eratic autrocracy and an ally of Militarism and Imperialism — for 
indeed modern imperialism is perhaps best explained by reference 
to the unbounded ambition and unscrupulous practices of industrial 
leaders in modern life; in the latest period, government in Europe 
comes to receive its impulse largely from men of this sort and the 
States develop in their foreign policies a corresponding ambition 
and ruthlessness — hence probable that the chief responsibility lies 
with Finance and Industry and their great exponents; representa- 
tives of the older aristocracies are more timid and conservative, 
less active and insatiable — states anxious to increase their resources 
come to rely mainly on the leaders of these new great enterprises; 
at times Governments are drawn unwittingly or without definite 
policy into imperialistic aims or courses through the initiative of 
such leaders — these tendencies manifested in all great states and 
the new imperialistic policies come into feverish competition over 
the whole earth. 

British and German Imperialism — The main illustrations of this 
process and the results found in the development and constantly 
growing rivalry for the last fifty years of the British and German 
Empires — this the main cause of the Great War. 

IV. Modern European Economic Development. Domination of 
Politics by Economic Interests. The Economic Interpretation 
of History and the War of Classes. 

Growing Economic Aspect of Modern History — The Growing- 
leadership of economic factors and interests in modern history — 
growth of population and capital the natural bases of modern Cap- 
italism and Proletarianism — supplemented in most parts of Europe 
by vicious land regimes, continuing or reconstructing feudal serfdom 
and enslaving or expropriating the peasant — the modern industrial 
system developed (Industrial Revolution) on these bases — the older 

[8] 






aristocracies now reinforced by another, a Plutocracy, grown out of 
the new industrial opportunities — as the State finds its serach for 
.additional resources dependent mainly on industrial development 
the representatives of this development rapidly win a steadily grow- 
ing influence over state policies and in political parties — the in- 
tensification of industrial and commercial life causes the average 
man to become indifferent to politics and the idealism of the French 
Revolution flickers out — there follows an age of political realism 
sind business administration, with increasing disregard of the in- 
terests of the masses — a new Kegime of Privilege — the slow de- 
Telopment of Humanitarianism a prelude to Socialism. 

Socialist Development — The relations between nineteenth cen- 
tury Radicalism and Socialism — the development of the socialistic 
doctrines and platforms — the partial recovery of Liberalism from 
"the paralyzing effects of the industrial revolution — the socialist 
parties in politics and the development of State Socialism — the latest 
phases of European radicalism — the helplessness of socialism in the 
war crisis. 



V. Nineteenth Century Development of Democracy in Europe. 

Beginnings of Modern Democracy — American and French 
Revolutions — The consideration of this must always be based on 
the American and French Revolutions though of course its history 
•does not begin there — error in assuming that advance of democracy 
lias been steady and continuous since that time; as matter of fact 
has been fluctuating, and has received in latest period some serious 
setbacks — as shown by the fact that we are now told that it is again 
fighting for its life. 

The main question concerns political organization and operation, 
whether the problems of the present day state can be adequately dealt 
with through a democratic organization and operation of administra- 
tion — it is a question of practical politics, and the conditions of 
government today are so different from those of the epoch of the 
Declaration of Independence and of the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man that we cannot any longer meet the question simply by 
reaffirming our faith in the political philosophy of our forefathers — 
light can be got mainly by following the historical development. 

slow and Uncertain Advance of Democracy — The Democracy 
of the French Revolution was of course thoroughly discredited by 
the course of the Revolution and Napoleonic Empire, and being de- 

m 



nounced as the cause of the long wars it was natural that Europe 
should take measures against it, and that the system it had attacked 
should have been continued and reconstructed as far as possible — 
what it had attacked and sworn enemity to was essentially not 
either Monarchy or practical autocracy, for the Napoleonic Empire 
could claim and did claim to be bulit on and to be carrying on the 
principles of the Revolution — what it had attacked was the whole 
Regime of Privilege, of privileged governing classes and interests, 
and the warfare against this regime was for the most part con- 
tinued by the Napoleonic autocracy — but still that autocracy also 
aided the privileged or governing classes to reestablish themselves, 
and after the Empire they everywhere are found again in control — 
but the basis of their power had nevertheless been destroyed 
wherever Republican or Imperial France had extended the revolu- 
tionary principles; the process of peasant emancipation could not 
be long arrested any more than the downfall of guild monopoly in. 
trade and industry; nor could the progress of the placing of con- 
stitutional restrictions on administration be stayed. The constitu- 
tional development that went on was, however, on the English rather 
than the French model, and it was not perceived that it must yield 
eventually the same democratic result — the surviving exponents of the 
French Revolution apparently did not perceive this any better than 
the moderate Liberalism of the time, and the successive radicals or 
republican outbreaks give reactionaries an opportunity every now 
and then, and help to keep liberalism conservative — and steady im- 
provement of administration cuts ground from under feet of the- 
Republican agitation — a final blow given to it by the new National- 
ism. 

Democratic Failures and the Xew Nationalism — The demo- 
cratic failures of 1848 seemed to have given final blow to French 
Revolutionary idealism, and the following quarter century is a period, 
of active warlike nationalist expansion and consolidation — the new 
national governments extend the field of administrative operation, 
the extensions being for the most part called for in the interests 
of the rapid development of the Industrial Revolution; the mid- 
dle-class representatives of these interests settle down to a tacit 
alliance with the older governing elements that might be expressed 
as an alliance of these elements (Autocracy, Aristocracy, Bureau- 
cracy) with moderate Constitutionalism and Capitalism — and the 
alliance is directed against extreme democracy, though shows of 
concessions are made to the latter (as by Bismarck in his ac- 

[10] 



eeptanee of the popularly elected Reichstag), and English Parlia- 
mentarism comes everywhere into vogue. Meanwhile the Rights of 
Man had found a new expression in the social philosophy of Marx 
and others, and Socialism had begun its warfare against the new 
governing elements. This Socialism maintains a great distrust of 
Parliamentarism, and the extensions of the franchise that steadily 
go on are brought about more through the political maneuvers n\' 
the contending political parties than by popular pressure — to fight 
Socialism a State Socialism comes into administrative practice, 
this being incidentally a considerable impetus to the extension of 
The work of government and the centralizing of its machinery. In 
the last years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth Parliamentarism falls almost everywhere into discredit 
for its inefficiency and corruption, and fails consequently to make 
any progress toward the securing of popular control over adminis- 
tration — even in the few places where such a control was reached 
it failed to provide satisfaction for the extremist demands, and the 
putting of these demands almost everywhere into a socialistic form 
enabled the central bureaucratic administrations to keep place by 
appealing to the fears of the moderate, thus keeping up the alliance 
also between capitalism and the adversaries of popular government. 

Socialism Begins Its Warfare Against Governing Elements — 
All this then would seem to mean that democratic progress had 
really been more or less checked or diverted, that selected governing 
classes and interests had retained or increased their defensive and 
offensive powers, that Capitalism perhaps was paralyzing Liberalism. 
The proletariat masses were looked on by capitalism as part of its 
equipment, and by the older governing interests as "food for pow- 
der" — but at the same time the central bureaucratic administration, 
controlled by special interests, seemed to be justifying their control 
by effective administration and by an enlightened social policy — 
but the war was to show that this was a small benefit as against 
the menace of the masses of being plunged without consultation 
into hopeless misery. 



[11 



VI. The European Territory and State System From Points of 
View of Race and Language, and of Physical and Economic 
Geography. Relations to This of Variations in European Cul- 
ture and Institutions. The Problem of Nationality. 

Well-established conclusions as to historical effects of climate 
and of physical and economic geography — an examination of the 
European territory from these points of view — the mystery of race 
and the danger of undue consideration to it — the facts as to racial 
and linguistic divisions in Europe — some considerations with re- 
gard to variations in culture and institutions among the European 
peoples — the elements and degree of cultural unity in Europe; how 
the three great divisions (Latin, Teutonic, Slav) are affected by 
religious history — the mystery of nationality and the necessity of 
reaching some conclusions as to its political import. 

VII. The Problems of the Great Powers in Europe. Germany 
and Central Europe. Nationalism and Its Extensions (Pan- 
Germanism, Panslavism, etc.). 

Central European Development — The warlike aspects of Mod- 
ern European history; some of the causes and results — practically 
all problems located in or reaching back into Central Europe, the 
result mainly of the racial and linguistic mixture and of physio- 
graphy — the eighteenth century breakdown of the old Central Europe 
completed by the French Revolutionary period, and the Nineteenth 
Century began with makeshifts — the new Nationalism comes in as 
a transforming force and by 1871 would seem to have led to satis- 
factory settlements — but results in reality sadly deficient and 
spoiled by the later development — the Bismarck Triple Alliance 
effort to dominate the situation by uniting the interests of the Cen- 
tral European Powers under German leadership seemed a master 
stroke, but it could continue to be effective only while the animating 
spirit and aim remained conservative and pacific and occupied mainly 
with keeping dangerous elements down — when the Bismarckian 
leadership was replaced by a younger and more aggressive one these 
dangerous elements got beyond control and the chance of success 
of the Triple Alliance was gone — and with Bismarck's fall there 
appears also the beginning of the getting together of European ele- 
ments aiming to make the most of the dangerous developments in 
order to thwart German control — the Dual Alliance stage passes 
into the "encirclement" one, while concurrently German policy be- 

[12] 






conies more and more unscrupulous and imperialistic, the Triple Al- 
liance being kept up as an instrument of German domination. 

Problems of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland — The definite prob- 
lems and questions — Alsace-Lorraine — Poland — Italian irredentism — 
Balkan peninsula — the Mediterranean world and interests neces- 
sarily embraced in the Central European field, forming a bridge to 
connect its problems with the larger ones in Asia and Africa. 



VIII. Development of the War Situation and the Final Out- 
break. 

Democratic Progress Checked by Capitalism — This means a 
consideration of the political development through the 20 or 25 
years preceding the outbreak of the war, i. e., from the fall of Bis- 
marck in 1890 or perhaps better from the formation of the Dual 
Alliance in 1892 — the temporizing, opportunist, Metternichian 
character of the Bismarckian leadership of European politics and 
the general results — succession of the Personal government of an 
impulsive and over-confident young ruler, anxious to play a great 
part and apparently unconscious of the real situation — an eager 
exponent of the new Imperialism and under influence of the more 
astute manipulators of it — impatient of the Bismarck temporizing, 
endowed with both the romanticism and the realism of Frederick 
the Great, and probably confident that the time was ripe for the 
playing of such a great part again — believed that Germany's cen- 
tral position and more efficient Avielding of concetrated resources 
made it possible for her to settle finally the problems of Central 
Europe by establishing Germany's control there beyond dispute — 
which would also enable her to bring a dominating weight into the 
World Empire scrambles of the Powers. Bismarck had addressed 
himself with great success to maintaining and increasing the an- 
tagonism between England on the one hand and France and Rus- 
sia on the other, while Germany seemed to have got a seeure hold 
.on Italian polities and finance. 

This seems to be the start of Germany's new aggressive policy, 
and little doubt that from at least this time she is occupied mainly 
in preparing for war and in manoeuvring for a good opening — 
every effort put forth to develope the German forces, especially 
naval — but at first the idea probably not to attack England di- 
rectly but to keep her from impeding the German plans, the whole 
colonial and naval policy being rather in the shape of a menace 

[13] 



to her and being really subsidiary to the plans in Central Europe 
and Nearer Asia and Africa. 

British Foreign Policy — The first decade of the twentieth cen- 
tury changes the situation through the great change in English 
foreign policy and relations brought about mainly by Edward Vll 's 
keen insight into the situation and successful efforts to end the 
collisions of England with France and Eussia and make ready for 
the German danger — no doubt this was the policy of "encirclement" 
that Germany complained of, and hence the plausibility of the Ger- 
man contention that it is responsible for the war. If the war had 
not finally come as it did and if its progress had not since taught 
us so much of the German aims and methods, we might be misled 
on this point; as it is, we can now have little doubt that the English 
policy was defensive, that Edward and Delcasse were astute and 
well-informed, and that the discovery by Germany of the miscar- 
riage of her plans caused a conflict with England to become in her 
mind "inevitable" — and there can also be little doubt that this 
conflict would have been braved earlier if the naval development had 
been further advanced, and especially if the submarine had earlier 
reached a dependable stage. 

The various points of friction and successive crises — the final op- 
portunity and German conspiracy. 

IX. The European War Becomes a World War. 

Why a World War.' — Could it have remained simply a European 
war ? Why does it become a World war, and what does that de- 
velopment mean? If fought as earlier wars had been it probably 
would have remained and ended European, and would probably then 
have come before this time to a conclusion that would be only a 
truce — this result has been made impossible by German methods of 
warfare, and by the disclosures the war has brought as to the 
German menace to the peace and progress of the world — these dis- 
closures have further brought forward the more fundamental issue 
as to the survival (with modern improvements) in Germany of an 
Old Kegime spirit and policy, and of the necessity for Democracy 
to demonstrate its right to live in a world so menaced. 



[14] 



X. General Aspects and Results of the World War. The Impend 
ing Transformation of Europe. The Advance of Americanism. 

Misleading Lessons of Previous Wars — All previous wars 
fought out on the field of battle and by limited professional forces 
— a comparatively brief trial of strength sufficient to reach a de- 
cision — hence noncombatants and neutrals apart, and recognised as 
retaining rights — the more recent developments in the application 
of science to the art of war had not seemed to necessitate any ser- 
ious change in these respects, the tendency being to regard this 
development as likely to make the struggle even briefer though per- 
haps more appalling — a tendency moreover to believe that States 
would not venture on so terrible a struggle and that international 
"financial interests would be sufficient to preserve peace. 

Policy of " Frightfulness " Explained — But Germany had 
studied the matter more seriously and had prepared for a new kind 
of war, a war of nations employing their whole populations and 
using all their resources — hence, distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants would more or less disappear, while netural rights 
and immunities would also be if necessary disregarded. War would 
thus assume an aspect that would bring into play all human in- 
terests and the whole capital of civilization, and it was clear that 
humanity could not face a future of such warfare — the German 
policy apparently was to count on at least such a temporary in- 
timidation of the world in this situation as would enable the Ger- 
man aims to be realized, and this policy was backed up in military 
practice by a deliberate application of "Frightfulness" that was 
intended to paralyze all civilian opposition — the result instead was 
to force all civilized elements to come into action against Germany; 
there could no longer be real neutrals, and mankind was forced to 
conclude that warfare and civilization could no longer co-exist. 

American Motives and Aims — The German application of this 
policy brings about the intervention of America — development of 
the American policy from standpoint of redress of own injuries to 
that of the upholder of civilization; European problems taking a 
secondary place — probable results of this in effecting the 
transformation of Europe in an American sense — this transforma- 
tion already under way through the forced concentration of the 
whole population and of all activities on warfare — and as all are 
involved in the struggle it has come universally to be recognized as 
"being fundamentally one in the interest of the democratic reorganiza- 
tion of the World. 

[15 1 



UNIVERSITY EXTENSION DIVISION 



THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRESPONDENCE-STUD? 

offers instruction in studies required in each of the fol- 
lowing lines, bulletins on which will be mailed free on re- 
quest. 

IN THE COLLEGES 
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General basic studies Basic and technical studie*. 

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Studies required for liberal Prerequisite liberal arts 

arts degrees studies. 

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General basic studies 

IN COURSES AND DEPARTMENTS 
Mathematics 



Business 

Accounting, Administration, 
Correspondence, Geog- 
raphy, Law, Management, 
Organization, Retailing 

Chemistry 

Civil Engineering 

Commerce 

Education 

Electrical Engineering 

English 

History 

Home Economics 

Industry 

Journalism 

Languages 

French, German. Greek, He- 
brew, Italian, Latin, Span- 
ish 



Mechanical Drawing 

Mechanical Engineering 

Municipal Sanitary Engineer- 
ing 

Music 

Pharmacy 

Philosophy 

Physical Sciences 

Astronomy, Botany, Geol- 
ogy, Physics, Chemistry 

Political Economy 

Political Science 

Public Speaking 

Sociology 

Structural Engineering 

Surveying 

Teaching 



THE DEPARTMENT OF DEBATING AND PUBLIC DIS- 
CUSSION will mail on request bulletins on debating and 
discusison of public questions, free within the state, and 
elsewhere on receipt of price. 

THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL INFORMATION 
AND WELFARE will mail on request bulletins on Munici- 
pal Reference, Community Centers, Vocational Institutes, 
Industrial Education and Dependency, Community Insti 
tutes, Juvenile Probation, Municipal and Sanitary Engi- 
neering, Voting Machines, Community Music, Poor Relief. 
Vocational .Education for Disabled Soldiers, and Public 
Health, free within the state, and elsewhere on receipt of 
price. 

THE DEPARTMENT OF INSTRUCTION BY LECTURES 
will mail on request bulletins on the lectures and lecture 
courses. 

THE BUREAU OF VISUAL INSTRUCTION will mail an 
request information as to lantern slides and motion nictnre 
films lent within the state. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

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018 462 816 8 



